authorized by statute to make a warrantless search. Such a search did not violate the fourth amendment, and since postal regulations strictly prohibit the reading of any correspondence without a search warrant, there was no chill of defendants first amendment rights. Finally, in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States' the Court held that a warrantless seizure of automobiles parked in public places was permissible to satisfy the income tax liability of an individual taxpayer who was the appellant corporation's general manager. However, a warrantless search of appellant's office and seizure of papers found there was, in the absence of any exigent circumstances, a violation of the fourth amendment.
The fourth amendment was included in the Bill of Rights in response to the general warrants, "writs of assistance," by which the English Crown had given colonial customs officials sweeping authority to search virtually anywhere for goods imported into the colonies in violation of British tax laws. Denounced in 1761,6 these writs were an early focal point of colonial opposition to the Crown. Ironically, however, the new United States government soon passed legislation which guarded its own revenue nearly as jealously as the British government had guarded its colonial income. The first customs statute 7 provided for warrantless searches of vessels and ships, though not of private dwellings or buildings, and may be seen, therefore, to have outlined the first exception to the fourth amendment requirement of a search warrant. Other exceptions to the amendment developed much later, in the twentieth century, and most of these may be seen to be specific instances of the later-enunciated doctrine of exigent circumstances 8 mentioned in Ramsey. However, these exceptions were developed piecemeal, and only hindsight enables one to fit them into such a framework. The first major exception, which allows warrantless search and seizure incident to arrest, was stated in dictum by the United States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States 9 in 1914. The doctrine was embellished ten years later in Carroll v. United States 1 " where the Court interpreted the National Prohibition Act" as authorizing federal prohibition agents to stop, search and seize, without a warrant, an automobile believed to be transporting bootleg liquor. 12 This ruling became known as the automobile exception. The government's case in Chadwick was based on these two exceptions. The broader doctrine of exigent circumstances was first mentioned in dictum in McDonald v. United States ,i3 where Justice Douglas said, "We cannot ... excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing ... that the exigencies of the situation ment thereof, in any particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, they .. . shall, upon application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter such house, store, or other place (in the day time only) and there to search for such goods, and if any shall be found, to seize and secure the same for trial.... 8 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 683 (4th ed. rev. 1968) , defiies exigency in part as "any event or occasional combination of circumstances, calling for immediate action or remedy." 9 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) . 10 267 U. S. 132 (1924). 11 Tit. 2, § § 25, 26 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923 , § 10138'/2 m, 10138'/2 mm), 41 Stat. 305, 315; § 6 of supplemental act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 101842) . 12 See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 90 (1966) , where a distinction is drawn between goods seized for lack of duty paid and those seized to be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution. Landynski finds faulty the Court's reasoning that the long tradition of warrantless search and seizure in the area of customs searches justifies a warrantless search for criminal evidence.
13 335 U.S. 451 (1948) .
made that course imperative. ' ' 14 Other exceptions to the warrant requirement were listed in a recent court of appeals opinion:' 5 (1) hot pursuit, (2) plain view doctrine, (3) emergency doctrine, and (4) consent. With the exception of the last, all may be considered specific sorts of exigent circumstances.
Because the fourth amendment flatly prohibits unreasonable search and seizure, a search, to be constitutional, must be found to be reasonable. When exigent circumstances, whether the general doctrine or one of the specific exceptions, are pleaded as justification for a warrantless search, the Court must decide whether the asserted exigencies are sufficientwhether they are truly "exigent." If the Court determines that they are, the search is reasonable and thereby constitutional. With warrantless searches based on no exigency, the analysis is the same, in that the search, whether authorized by statute or alleged to be justified by some non-exigency based exception to the fourth amendment, must still be found to be reasonable. Because of the underlying value of the fourth amendment's protections and because of the Court's own interpretation that review by a neutral magistrate is essential when a citizen's privacy is at stake," the threshold for entry into the area of reasonableness is high. The burden is placed on the party seeking an exception, or the broadening of an existing exception, to the rule."
The Court in its recent decisions seems to be adhering to Justice Powell's concern, expressed in his concurrence to United States v. Watson, ' 8 that the exceptions to the warrant requirement remain tightly restricted and clearly drawn.
The reasoning in all three cases may be seen to revolve around a citizen's expectations of privacy with regard to international mail," in an office" 0 and in regard to locked luggage.
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Where these expectations were seen to be warranted and reasonable, the Court held that 14 Id. at 456.
15 United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 1973) .
" See Connally v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 546 (1977 only a search warrant can justify an intrusion.
22
But in an area where search is routine and indeed often physically intrusive, as in border searches, expectations of privacy are not commonly held, and therefore, warrantless search is permissible.23
In United States v. Chadwick, Amtrak officials in San Diego had noticed that a man and woman boarding a train for Boston were carrying with them a large footlocker which was leaking talcum powder, a substance train officials knew was often used to mask the odor of marijuana. The male passenger also matched a profile used to spot drug traffickers. Federal agents, informed of these facts, were on hand two days later when the train arrived in Boston. A trained dog sniffed the footlocker when it had been unloaded in the station and gave a signal to the agents indicating that a controlled substance was contained therein, but the agents waited to make their arrests until a third person had arrived with a car. The 200-pound footlocker had been loaded into the trunk of this vehicle when the arrests were made. The agents had neither arrest nor search warrants. The car, footlocker and arrestees were taken to the federal building in Boston, and one and onehalf hours later the double-locked footlocker was opened there with keys found upon the male passenger. Large amounts of marijuana were found in the footlocker, and respondents were indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute . 24 Before trial in the district court 25 the defendants moved to suppress the marijuana obtained by search of the footlocker. The government, having conceded that no warrant had been issued for the search, contended that it was nevertheless valid under the automobile exception of Carroll or as a search incident to arrest. In considering the automobile exception, the court pointed out that " [t] warrantless search of an automobile had taken place at the police station after a late-night arrest of four defendants seated in the car in a parking lot. In Chambers, the Court found the search permissible, Justice White reasoning that it was a choice between a warrantless search or a warrantless seizure while a search warrant was sought and that since both courses of action were equally intrusive on the defendants, either was "reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 28 The exigency which would have justified an immediate search of the auto-that it might be driven away if the police were required to leave to seek a warrant-was extended in time to justify the later warrantless search. In Chadwick, the district court found no such exigency and indeed no "nexus" at all between the search and the auto. 2 9 It was the footlocker, not the auto, which had been searched, and the court saw it as a mere coincidence that the footlocker was resting in the trunk of a car, rather than on a platform in the station or upon the ground at the time of the arrests. Had the arrests taken place when the footlocker was in either of the latter places, a warrant would have been required; the automobile exception could not be invoked on such a tenuous basis. The court went on to point out that the Carroll exception and its extensions were based on the presence of some exigency, some danger that the object of the search might be "spirited away." 30 A double-locked, 200-pound footlocker in a stationary car could not be whisked away by three defendants who had all been handcuffed and escorted to government cars. Furthermore, railroad guards and city policemen, as well as federal agents, were present at the scene of the arrest.
In considering the government's contention that the footlocker search was valid as incident to arrest, 31 After the district court had considered the Government's arguments concerning the automobile exception and had granted defendants' motion to suppress, the Government filed motions to reconsider and to vacate. In support of these motions, the Government then introduced evidence to support its contention that the incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless search of the footlocker. The government appealed its case, and the court of appeals, 34 after pointing out that exceptions to the fourth amendments must be well-defined and few in number 35 and that the burden was on the party seeking to fit within an exception," summarized with approval the district court's reasoning in regard to the automobile exception.
In pressing its contention that the search of the footlocker was valid as incident to the arrests, the government attacked the district court's reliance on Chimel, stating that that ruling was applicable only to searches of dwellings. The court was not persuaded and noted that the Chimel test had been employed in circumstances involving searches outside of dwellings.
3 7 The court refused to accept the government's proposed test of "reasonableness," stating that its duty was to consider whether the facts of the search at bar justified its inclusion in any established exception. Although the court conceded that it had upheld a warrantless search of a hand-carried briefcase at the scene of an arrest, 38 it distinguished such handheld luggage from the footlocker involved in Chadwick: handheld luggage was more closely related to the personal effects found on an arrestee, which may be searched without a warrant as incident to the arrest. 39 The court further admitted that some baggage was analo- gous to automobiles in that it could easily disappear before a warrant could be obtained, but pointed out that Carroll had made no mention of baggage and that the Supreme Court had made no definitive ruling on baggage outside the automobile area.
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" After noting that the government itself was not arguing that any exigency existed, the court concluded by stating that it found no exigency justifying the footlocker search. The district court's suppression Qrder was therefore affirmed.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari 42 to consider the question of the warrantless footlocker search and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. 43 The government's argument, as in the court of appeals, was that the fourth amendment protects only homes, offices and private communications and that only in searches in those contexts should the reasonableness of the search turn on whether a warrant was procured. Beyond these situations, the reasonableness of the search should depend only on whether there was probable cause that evidence of criminal conduct was present. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority, 44 disagreed, stating that "the Fourth Amendment 'protects people, not places. ' ' 45 "[M]ore particularly," he went on, "it protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy. ' 46 The issue thus became whether the warrantless search of the footlocker was unreasonable.
The Chief Justice reviewed the history of the fourth amendment and reasoned that although the public outcry at the time of the writing of 4 Id. at 781. The court further reasoned that "such an exception could have considerable impact, as its premises might seem to apply not only to baggage but to mail, express packages, and moving freight of all description." Id. at 782. 41 Senior District Judge Thomsen dissented on the ground that an officer who has probable cause to believe contraband is being transported in a suitcase or locker in his presence has the same authority to seize and search it without a warrant as he would to arrest someone committing another sort of felony in his presence. Id. at 785-86. 42 the Bill of Rights had centered mainly on searches of homes, there was no reason to conclude that the authors felt differently about searches conducted in public places. He further reasoned that the protection offered by the warrant requirement, which insured that a neutral magistrate had considered the facts of the situation 47 and assured the individual of the lawful authority of the searching officer, 4 " ,was equally valuable in or out of the home. The Chief Justice went on to point out that warrants had been required for a variety of searches conducted outside the home: a "bugging" in a public phone booth 49 S. 347 (1967) . In Katz, however, the Court had asserted that a "general right to privacy" was under the protection of the states. Id. at 350-51. Note that Katz was decided two years after Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) , where the Court had ruled that there was a constitutional right to marital privacy.
I In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) , a drunk driver's car was impounded in Wisconsin. The driver claimed to be an off-duty policeman; a local policeman searched the car which had been left unguarded out-of-doors for the service revolver he believed to be stored there. In the course of his search, he found bloody articles which were later used as evidence in a murder trial. The Court admitmobility of the vehicle could not be the only rationale upon which the automobile exception was based. The key, he continued, concerned expectations of privacy. Such expectations are much less with respect to an automobile: one rarely stores one's personal effects there, he pointed out, 5 6 and the contents and occupants of a car are in plain view on public roads.
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State licensing regulations's and inspection and custody procedures a made the automobile subject to public and official scrutiny as well. Such public display and concern is not present in regard to luggage, and therefore, since the defendants had placed personal effects in the footlocker and had taken the trouble to doublelock it, their expectations were that their privacy would be respected. Further, since the footlocker was safely ensconced in the federal building, there was no concern or danger that it might be moved before a warrant could be obtained.
In response to the government's theory that a warrantless search of property in possession of one arrested in a public place is permitted so long as there is probable cause that the property contains contraband, the Chief Justice outlined the rationale upon which the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement is based, relying, like the court of appeals, upon Chimel. Because the arrestee might attempt to use a weapon or destroy evidence, a search to uncover such items was reasonable within the area of the arrestee's control. He concluded that:
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access ted the evidence as the fruits of a proper, although warrantless, search designed to protect the public.
In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the defendant's car had been impounded after a series of parking violations. A routine search uncovered marijuana in the car.
In Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) , the defendant had been arrested on a narcotics charge. Evidence found in his impounded car one week after the arrest was held admissible despite the lack of a warrant.
See also to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest. 66 In a footnote, the Chief Justice qualified his statement to exclude the situation where the luggage was believed to contain explosives or other, equally dangerous materials. 6 Because no other exigency justified the warrantless search of the footlocker, the judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented on the ground that he saw no significant difference between the situation in Chadwick and that in United States v. Edwards, 62 which upheld the search of personal effects without a warrant after the arrestee was in jail, or in those cases involving impounded cars which had been searched thoroughly, locked compartments included.63 Because the issuance of a warrant in a case such as Chadwick would be, Justice Blackmun believes, a matter of routine, the fourth amendment protection afforded by the majority's holding will have little practical value. In addition, he went on, the opinion may have little impact since other doctrines will usually sustain warrantless searches by the police. He reasoned that allowing property such as the footlocker to be searched where a valid arrest had taken place in public would result in simplifying constitutional law with no serious diminishing of a citizen's fourth amendment rights. Finally, he pointed out that had the arrest taken place when the respondents were seated upon it or standing near it, the footlocker would have been in their control and thus searchable. It should be noted, however, that Justice Brennan in his concurrence disputed this assertion, reasoning that "control" of a double-locked, 200-pound footlocker could not be so easily resolved .64
The 68 In addition, that premise would seem to be at the very heart of the fourth amendment.
In United States v. Ramsey, a customs inspector dealing with international letter class mail 69 in the New York General Post Office noticed that eight envelopes arriving from Thailand, a known source of heroin, were particularly bulky and that all appeared to have been addressed with the same typewriter. An envelope was weighed and found to be three times as heavy as normal letters. The official opened the envelopes and found a white powder which tests revealed to be heroin. The envelopes were then sent to the Washington area, as per their addresses, and were delivered under the surveillance of the Drug Enforcement Administra-66 97 S. Ct. at 2489 (Blackmun, Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
67 See note 40 supra. A ruling which permitted the warrantless search of the footlocker would establish a precedent which could form the basis for future findings that warrantless searches of similar itemspackages, baggage, freight-were also permissible. The result would be a whole new exception to the fourth amendment and a further erosion of its protections. Chief Justice Burger warned of this sort of danger in United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 127 (1973) : "The seductive plausibility of single steps in a chain of evolutionary development of a legal rule is often not perceived until a third, fourth, or fifth 'logical' extension occurs.... [T]he aggregate or end result is one that would never have been seriously considered in the first instance."
68 See text following note 100 and accompanying note 120.
69 International letter class mail is similar to domestic first class mail.
[Vol. 68 tion. One defendant collected the envelopes from three different addresses and was arrested after giving a second defendant a paper bag in which officals found six envelopes containing heroin, along with cash and "cutting" matter for the heroin. The district court denied defendants' motion to suppress the heroin, and defendants were convicted of several related narcotics offenses . 70 The court of appeals reversed, 7 1 refusing to accept the government's contention that the opening of the envelopes in the case at bar was a border search permitted as an exception to the fourth amendment. The court noted that a number of courts have held 72 that packages moving through international borders may be subjected to a warrantless search and thus are included in the border search exception. Indeed, two circuits 73 had gone further and inluded letter mail, as well as packages, in the exception, on the ground that there was no meaningful difference between the search of automobiles, baggage, people, and packages crossing the border and a search of mail crossing the border. The District of Columbia Circuit, however, reasoned that the border search exception was based on the exigent circumstances doctrine. The volume and mobility of border traffic were seen to be the underlying reasons for the exception. The court found little analogy between letters and people or automobiles as transporters of contraband. Size alone limited the former to only a few possibilities, such as drugs or small jewelry, and these, the court pointed out, could often be detected by such external means as trained dogs, x-rays, or metal detectors. Further, because the Supreme Court had unanimously held that authorities were permitted to detain mail in order to investigate suspicious circumstances or obtain search warrants, 7 4 there was no need for an official to open letter mail without a warrant.
The court of appeals also relied on the spirit of two recent Supreme Court decisions which it perceived as attempts to keep the border exception narrowly-defined. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 75 the appellant, in his automobile, had been stopped by a roving patrol twenty miles north of the United States-Mexico border: The Court ruled in a five to four decision that there was no warrant nor probable cause for halting the car, and the marijuana found in the ensuing search could not be used against the appellant. Two years later, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 76 the Court held that a border patrol's judgment that a car contained "Mexican-looking" people was not a reasonable basis for stopping it. The respondent's motion to suppress in his trial for transporting illegal aliens was thus granted. The Court stated that "reasonableness . . . depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security. 77 Finally, the court of appeals considered the fact that these were letters which were searched and quoted Justice Holmes: "[T]he use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues .... " Texas, 80 the court concluded that the risks were too great to allow international mail to be opened without a showing of probable cause and the obtaining of a search warrant from a neutral magistrate.
The court found little hindrance to the convenience of officials in its ruling, especially in view of the fact that when the customs officials transferred the envelopes to the District of Columbia post office, officials there had obtained a warrant before reopening them. The court, with one dissent, thus reversed the convictions.
The Confronting the issue of letter searches, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that there was no basis in the border search exception's rationale for differentiating between the mode of entry of mail into the country and that of people or automobiles. He relied on Cotzhausen v. Nazro9 0 where the Court had declared that "if the mail is to be left unwatched, and all its sealed contents, even after delivery to the person to whom addressed, are to be exempt from seizure, ... dutiable matter of great value may thus be introduced from foreign countries."' He went on to point out that the court of appeals had erred in seeing the border search exception as one built on the doctrine of exi- 91 Id. at 218. However, in Cotzhausen, as the Court there obliquely revealed, the dutiable matter-a shawl-had not been seized until it was in the hands of the addressee and had been opened by her. Justice Rehnquist did not make note of this difference in the fact situation.
[Vol. 68 gent circumstances. 92 He found the border search exception analogous to the search incident to arrest exception and saw neither exception as based on the doctrine of exigent circumstances.
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As for the court of appeals' view that its decision in Ramsey was consistent with the spirit of Brignoni-Ponce and Almeida-Sanchez, Justice Rehnquist asserted that those decisions were based on a finding that the searches had not taken place at a border or its functional equivalent. They were, therefore, inapplicable to the case at bar.
In his conclusion, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that because postal regulations strictly forbade the reading of foreign letter mail without a search warrant, 94 any chill on first amendment rights was not only "minimal," but also "wholly subjective." 95 Although Justice Rehnquist denied that Ramsey is an expansion of the border search exception to the fourth amendment, 96 it seems clear that the Court's allowance of a warrantless search of undelivered international mail does broaden the exception. 97 Because authorization for border searches predates the fourth amendment itself, it may be that the Court considers the border search exception excluded from the Katz rule that fourth amendment exceptions be kept tightly restricted. Although the District of Columbia Circuit did not see things that way, both the Seventh and the Ninth Circuits have. 9 8 And in view of the fact that packages may be searched without a warrant, to exclude letters would mean drawing a line at some arbitrary point. When is a bulky envelope a package and when a letter? How large may an envelope be and still remain a letter? Further, as the dissenting judge in the court of appeals noted, 99 a package can also 92 See note 13 supra and accompanying text. 93 In view of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Chimel that fear of an arrestee's grabbing a weapon or destroying evidence was the basis for allowing a warrantless search incident to arrest, it is difficult to see how Justice Rehnquist arrived at such a categorization of the search incident to arrest exception. 9 19 C.F.R. § 145.3 (1977) . contain writings-pamphlets, letters and so forth-and therefore a first amendment chill could be seen to exist in permitting their opening as well.
With so much precedent in favor of opening international mail, it is possible that a point of no return had been reached; that to be logically consistent meant either expanding the exception or overruling the decisions of many courts. Possibly the necessity for logical extension, present in Ramsey and not in Chadwick, justifies the possible first amendment chill of the former, although even "minimal" and "subjective" erosions of principle are suspect.
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In addition, Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Ramsey, while it parses well logically, fails to come to grips with several of the court of appeals' most salient and practical points, in particular: (1) the ease with which a warrant to open mail may be obtained, given the Court's decision that delay for that purpose is permissible; and (2) the fact that much contraband can be detected by external means such as dogs and metal detectors. However, considered in relation to the framework outlined in Chadwick-one's reasonable expectations of privacyRamsey fits. The long tradition of border searches, of both people and mail, makes it arguably reasonable to expect bulky mail from Thailand to be searched for illegal drugs.
In G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, the Internal Revenue Service had determined that an individual taxpayer, who was general manager of the appellant corporation, owed nearly a million dollars in taxes for the years 1970 and 1971. The taxpayer had filed no returns for those years and, in addition, was a fugitive from justice, having escaped from a federal marshall after being convicted on a charge of misapplication of national bank funds.
10 1 These factors were considered to jeopardize collection of the taxes. Consequently, in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,102 a jeop-100 See note 66 and accompanying text. 101 The taxpayer was convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1969) and 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1976) , and the conviction was affirmed in United States v. Cooper, 464 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1972) .
102 I.R.C. § 6861(a). The statute reads in relevant part: "If the Secretary believes that the assessment or collection of a deficiency . . . will be jeopardized by delay, he shall ... immediately assess such deficiency ... and notice and demand shall be made ... for the payment thereof." ardy assessment was made. In attempting to collect the taxes owed, the IRS determined that the appellant corporation was the taxpayer's alter-ego. The corporation, supposedly a car-leasing concern, listed no employees, had paid no state sales tax and had no license to conduct business in the area of its location. However, the corporation owned several very expensive collectors' cars, and the IRS seized, without a warrant, two Rolls Royces, three Stutzes and a Jaguar. All of the automobiles were taken from public places. Also, with the aid of a locksmith, the revenue officers entered, again without a warrant, appellant's place of business on two separate occasions; on their second visit, furnishings and papers were seized.
The corporation filed suit against the IRS and individual agents, claiming wrongful levy and asking for return of the autos, suplression of the evidence gained from the search and damages. The district court's judgment in favor of the corporation awarded damages in an undetermined amount, both compensatory and punitive, against individual revenue agents, suppressed the use of the seized documents or photocopies of them, ordered all seized assets returned and removed all levies against such assets.
The court of appeals reversed as to all the critical issues."°3 After concluding that the trial court had erred in its decision that the corporation was not the fugitive taxpayer's alter-ego, the court agreed with the Government that further error had been committed when the trial court "entered no independent findings of fact or conclusions of law but merely accepted those prepared by appellee."' 0 4 The court found the search and seizure of both the automobiles and the documents statutorily authorized' 0 5 and concluded that the government's lien on the property seized was valid.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' 0 6 on 105 G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1975) . The court, in accordance with a government concession, affirmed the trial court's return of stock to the taxpayer's son, an intervener.
"o Id. at 940. The court of appeals noted that the district court had been condemned twice before for this practice. a limited fourth amendment issue, the permissibility of the seizures to satisfy tax assessments, affirming in part and reversing in part the decision of the lower court. Justice Blackmun wrote for a unanimous court. After reviewing the statutes which provide authority for tax levies,' 0 7 he pointed out that the levy power was essential to the country. It was, indeed, its "lifeblood."' 8 Because the Court had limited its consideration of the case to the fourth amendment issue, the court of appeals' determinations that the levies were valid and that the appellant corporation was the individual taxpayer's alter-ego were accepted. Thus, Justice Blackmun reasoned, probable cause existed for the seizure of the corporation's assets in satisfaction of the tax liability. The only question then became whether warrants were necessary in order to make the seizures of the automobiles and documents reasonable. prime example of the early judicial interpretation of the fourth amendment, which, in the tradition of the English common law, was based on property rights. Thus the government was entitled to seize property to which it had a superior claim. This premise has since been discredited, explained Justice Brennan in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) , and seizures may be unreasonable under the fourth amendment even though the government asserts a superior common-law property interest. The remedy for the seizure found unreasonable under the fourth amendment then becomes suppression, rather than replevin.
ized by a valid search warrant."' ' n He then cited a string of cases in support of the premises that (1) The General Government has a right to pass all laws which shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the collection are within the direction of the Legislature: may not general warrants be considered necessary for this purpose, as well as for some purposes which it was supposed at the framing of their constitutions the State Governments had in view? If there was reason for restraining the State Governments from exercising this power, there is
The Government argued further that since IRS statutes curbed agent discretion and since broad discretion given to building inspectors in Camara had led the Court there to require a warrant, that case was not applicable in the case at bar. Justice Blackmun, however, pointed out that the applicable statutes in the present case" 9 were hardly a restraint upon IRS discretion when, for example, the Secretary of the Treasury could choose between seizure of property from either public or private places. He read the statute as silent on the subject of invasion of privacy and therefore considered the case governed by the usual fourth amendment rule that unless a search of private property fits into one of the few defined exceptions to the warrant requirement, it is unreasonable. A final Government argument, that its search was valid under the exigent circumstances doctrine, was disposed of summarily by the Court. Justice Blackmun pointed out that the revenue agents had waited two days after their first entry into the offices before returning to seize the documents. There was, therefore, plenty of time in which to obtain a warrant.
The Court in G.M. Leasing, as its unanimity indicates, took an orthodox position 120 on the fourth amendment. The issues were less complex than those in Chadwick or Ramsey because no serious attempt was made by the Government to persuade the Court that the warrantless search of the corporation's offices fit into an accepted exception to the fourth amendment requirement. However, the case may be seen to fit nicely within the "reasonable expectations of privacy" framework iterated by Chief Justice Burger in Chadwick. While an automobile or a bulky letter from Thailand may reasonably be expected to be subjected to government regulation and surveillance, the contents of one's office-its files and furnishings-have not been traditionally under the eye of the government. Indeed papers are specifically declared as protected in the fourth amendment itself.
like reason for restraining the Federal Government. If one were to rely on Chadwick or G.M. Leasing in order to see just where the Burger Court is going with regard to the fourth amendment, the conclusion would be that it is holding the line on exceptions to the amendment, possibly even retreating from its holding in United States v. Biswell.' 2 ' However, Chadwick, and Ramsey, both products of a divided Court unlike, G.M. Leasing, definitely extended the border exception to the amendment, albeit only a hair's breadth in view of the widelyestablished proposition that packages in international mail may be subjected to warrantless search. Ramsey was also consistent with the rulings of two out of three of the courts of appeals which had faced the question. However, if the spirit of and the framework for analysis set up in Chadwick are adhered to in the future, that is, if the Court continues to hold the line on expanding the exceptions to the fourth amendment and subjects every case to the test of what reasonable expectations of privacy were involved, it may well be that Chadwick will become the most influential of the three decisions considered here. Certainly, it is an example of a "hard case" (in view of the expansive automobile exception precedents) which seems most in tune with what the framers of the fourth amendment intended. against warrantless search of international letter mail, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits had found similar searches constitutional. See note 73 supra.
